

Deep Dive into the IoT Backend Ecosystem

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
imdea
software

TU Delft

IMC 2022, Nice, France

IoT Backend Server Infrastructure: support IoT devices

Off-loaded device
functionalities, Data
Ingestion,
Authentication, Update,
Monitoring, ...



IoT Backend Providers: Companies providing specialized IoT backend services

IoT Backend Provider:
Amazon IoT, Google IoT Core
Siemens Mindsphere...

A Haystack Full of Needles:
Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild

Open for hire: attack trends and
misconfiguration pitfalls of IoT devices

Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices

A Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach

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Northeastern University

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
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IoT Backends



Research Goals:


RG1: Inferring and **characterizing** the IoT Backends

RG2: Characterization of the IoT backend traffic (as seen in a large European ISP)

Outline

- Methodology
- RG1: Inferring and Characterizing the IoT Backends
- RG2: Characterization of the IoT Backend Traffic
- Limitations
- Summary

Methodology Overview



Studied Backend Providers


- Alibaba IoT
- Amazon IoT
- Baidu IoT
- Bosch IoT Hub
- Cisco Kinetic
- Fujitsu IoT
- Google IoT core
- Huawei IoT
- IBM IoT
- Microsoft Azure IoT Hub
- Oracle IoT
- PTC ThingWorx
- SAP IoT
- Siemens Mindsphere
- Sierra Wireless
- Tencent IoT

Account for 90+% of IoT backend revenue *

* IoT Analytics. 2022 List of IoT Platforms Companies. <https://iot-analytics.com/product/list-of-iot-platform-companies>.

Methodology: Identifying IoT domains and their patterns


- IoT backend domains:
 - specified in the provider's documentation
 - follow well-defined form
 - <subdomain>.<region>.<secondlevel-domain(SLD)>**
 - xyszd23d.iot.us-east2.amazonaws.com.
- Regular expression:
 - `(.+)\.iot\.([[:alnum:]]+)(-([[:alnum:]]+)+)?(\.amazonaws\.com\.)`
 - `.\.(iot-(coaps|mqtt|https|amqp|slap|ida)\.)+\.(myhuaweicloud\.com\.)`



Methodology: Mapping domains and patterns to IPv4/6

- Find hosts with matching TLS certificates:


- **Censys, IPv4**
- Custom **IPv6** scan



- DNS lookup to find other hosts(e.g., Non-TLS)
 - Matching A/AAAA/CNAME records in passive DNS datasets like DNSDB
 - Resolving the DNSDB records from multiple locations

Methodology: Shared / dedicated Infra. detection

- Check whether other (non-IoT) services are hosted on same IPs
 - Lookup IPv4/6 addresses in DNSDB to find other domains hosted on same IPs



RG1: Inferring and Characterizing the IoT Backends

- Deployment strategies
- Location
- Supported protocols

Deployment Strategies:

- Diverse deployment methodologies & # IPs
- 6 companies rely on public clouds
- One backend provider relies on another one


Backend Provider Name [Source]	# AS	# IPv4 /24 (IPv6 /56)	# Loca- tions	# Coun- tries	Protocols (Ports)	Strate- gy
Alibaba IoT [3–5]	2	73 (2)	27	13	MQTT(1883), HTTPS(443), CoAP(5682)	DI
Amazon IoT [8, 17, 19]	4	9,000 (20)	18	15 +Anycast	MQTT(8883, 443), HTTPS(443, 8443)	DI
Baidu IoT [21–23]	2	26 (1)	2	1	MQTT(1883, 1884, 443), HTTP(80, 443), CoAP(5682, 5683)	DI
Bosch IoT Hub [24]	1	290 (0)	1	1	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443), AMQP(5671), CoAP(5684)	PR
Cisco Kinetic [28, 29]	2	14 (0)	4	2	MQTT(8883, 443), TCP(9123, 9124)	PR
Fujitsu IoT [45]	1	2 (0)	2	1	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443)	DI
Google IoT core [49, 51]	1	114 (11)	77	14	MQTT(8883,443), HTTPS(443)	DI
Huawei IoT [58]	1	26 (0)	2	1	MQTT(8883, 443), HTTPS(8943), CoAP(NA)	DI
IBM IoT [59, 60]	2	116 (0)	12	8	MQTT(8883, 1883), HTTP(S)(80,443)	DI
Microsoft Azure IoT Hub [20, 67]	1	282 (0)	39	16	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443), AQMP(5671),	DI
Oracle IoT [68, 69]	3	67 (0)	10	8	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443)	DI+PR
PTC ThingWorx [74]	3	881 (0)	10	8	Protocol Agnostic	PR
SAP IoT [81, 82]	6	2.929 (0)	7	5	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443)	PR
Siemens Mindsphere [84, 85]	4	126 (1)	3	3 +Anycast	MQTT(8883), HTTPS(443), OPC-UA	PR
Sierra Wireless [86–88]	4	7 (2)	4	4	MQTT(8883,1883), HTTP(S)(80,443), CoAP(5682,5686)	PR
Tencent IoT [94, 95]	5	47 (2)	5	4	MQTT(8883,1883), HTTP(S)(80,443), CoAP(5684)	DI

RG2: Characterization of the IoT Backend Traffic (as seen at a large European ISP)

- Traffic patterns
- Traffic Localization:
How much IoT traffic leaves Europe? (privacy)
- Outage:
Effect of an outage on the IoT traffic (case study)


Traffic Patterns

- Diverse traffic patterns



Traffic Localization: GDPR Implications?


>70% of observed IoT backend server IPs are outside of EU (65% in US)



~>50% of observed IoT subscriber lines contact Non-EU servers

Majority of traffic stays within Europe

AWS Outage: December 7th, 2021



Limitations

- Reliance on public documentation
- Limited view on IPv6
- Shared infrastructure detection
- Single vantage point

Summary

For Domains
& Regexes
Scan this



RG1: Inferring and characterizing IoT Backends:

- First study on Infrastructure of IoT Backend Providers
- Methodology to infer the IoT backends
- Can be repurposed to identify candidate IoT traffic in passive data

RG2: Characterization of the IoT backend traffic:

- Diverse IoT traffic patterns
- ~>50% of observed IoT subscriber lines contact Non-EU servers

Backup Slides

IoT Backend Providers: Important, yet understudied

Amazon Outage Shuts Down IoT Vacuums, Doorbells, Fridges, Even Home Locks

Talk about a single point of failure.

/ Robots & Machines / Alexa / Amazon / Internet Of Things

source: <https://futurism.com/amazon-outage-iot>

Sierra Wireless partially restores network following ransomware attack

Production lines are operating again at the IoT device manufacturer, but internal IT systems remain down following a cyberattack on March 20.

source: <https://www.zdnet.com/article/sierra-wireless-partially-restores-network-following-ransomware-attack/>

Recent research focuses on IoT devices

**A Haystack Full of Needles:
Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild**

**Open for hire: attack trends and
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
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
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
Characterization:

- Diverse deployment methodologies & # IPs
- Cisco, PTC, Siemens, SAP, Sierra Wireless, and Bosch rely on public clouds
- Siemens partially relies on Amazon IoT






IP Stability








Slight #of European customers were affected


of Subscriber lines per provider



of Downstream vs Upstream Traffic Ratio



Application Mix



Application Mix

